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Abstract 
Departing from the observation that both analysts and practitioners face problems of 
meaningful categorization of social order in general and the European political-
administrative system in particular, this paper suggests a conceptual frame through 
which European administrative order may be understood. Providing such a frame is 
important, because the catalogue of categories of the European Union (EU) polity 
developed so far fails to acknowledge sufficiently its administrative dimension. Given 
that the ongoing political transformation in the EU implies ever more administrative 
interaction between political levels in order to coordinate, manage and implement 
policies, this administrative dimension becomes ever more important. This paper thus 
sets out a three-folded agenda: Firstly, it offers a supplementary conceptual frame that 
takes the ‘administrative dimension’ seriously. It is suggested that the European 
politico-administrative organism should be conceived as a European multilevel 
administrative system (MLA). Secondly, the paper explains how the MLA approach differ 
from one of its main conceptual rivals – the multilevel governance approach (MLG). 
Finally, the paper offers some empirical illustrations of the value of the developed MLA 
approach for our understanding of the contemporary European administrative system.  
 
Introduction1 
The recent economic crisis has contributed to what can be understood as ‘institutional 
soul-searching’ and the raising of questions about the nature of res publica (Emery and 
Giauque 2014: 24). The challenge of understanding social and political order, however, 
is enduring to the social sciences (Waldo 1992: 149). Unveiling social order involves 
disentangling causes of order formation and distortions (Bartolini 2005; Fukuyama 
2011; March and Olsen 1989; Padgett and Powell 2012), consequences of order 
formation – especially how it challenges already existing orders (e.g. Bickerton 2012; 
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Olsen 2007) –, and suggesting how social order can be conceptualized. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly for a political system in the making, the institutional soul searching is 
particularly intense in the European Union (EU). Is the European order already mature 
enough to cope with the ongoing turbulences and those certainly still to come? Before 
this background we attempt to advance our understanding of the European 
administrative order, which, in our view, is the backbone of the emerging political 
system of the EU. More concretely, we discuss avenues how best to conceptualize this 
emerging administrative order. One enduring challenge in so doing is to establish 
meaningful categories that capture essential and enduring characteristics of such an 
order. Our starting assumption is therefore that adequate analytical categories to 
classify contemporary European political-administrative life should offer more empirical 
variation between than within categories. Departing from the observation that both 
analysts and practitioners face problems of meaningful categorization that capture 
essential aspects of social order in general (Dahlstrom et al. 2012; Painter and Peters 
2010: 6; Waldo 1992: 37), and the European political-administrative system in 
particular, this paper suggests a tentative conceptual frame through which 
administrative order may be understood. Putting thus the emphasis on administrative 
interaction and emerging structures is an attempt to rectify the ongoing debate about 
the coining categories of the EU polity in which the administrative dimension is by and 
large neglected. Be it neo-functionalism (Niemann and Schmitter 2009), constructivist 
perspectives (Checkel 2005), intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1998), or multilevel 
governance (Hooghe and Marks 2001; Marks 1992) – administrative factors are usually 
treated as secondary importance. The ambition of this paper is therefore three-folded:  
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- Firstly, it offers a supplementary conceptual frame that takes the ‘administrative 
dimensions’ seriously. It is suggested that the European politico-administrative system 
needs to be understood as a European multilevel administrative system (MLA).  
- Secondly, the ambition is to suggest how the MLA approach differs from what might 
be perceived as its main conceptual rivals – the multilevel governance approach 
(MLG). 
- Finally, the paper offers some empirical illustrations of how the MLA approach adds 
to our understanding of organizational formation and interaction in the contemporary 
European administrative system.  
 
Despite attaching focal attention to the administrative dimensions of the EU polity, 
‘public administration’ is not analyzed in isolation – as an ‘intellectual wasteland’ (Eluau 
1977: 421) - but rather as a set of capacities that mobilize systematic bias in the 
production of public policy (Arellano-Gault et al. 2013: 154; Gaus 1950: 168; 
Schattschneider 1975). Analyzing enduring patterns and dynamics of the administrative 
capacities of the EU are essential in our understanding of how public policy is shaped 
and executed. The MLA approach is thus also a theory of political organization. 
 
Two concerns underpin the relevance of choosing such a focus. Firstly, there is a broader 
theoretical interest behind analyzing the patterns and dynamics of the EU 
administrative system. This theoretical agenda relates to the challenge that the 
emerging EU administrative system poses to the sub-discipline of public administration 
which has been largely locked in ‘national laboratories’ (e.g. Christensen and Lægreid 
2011; Verhoest et al. 2012). Theoretical lessons from social sciences are arguably 
affected by the empirical laboratories available to scholars. The domain of public 
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administration may arguably gain theoretical advances by challenging methodological 
nationalism. As new forms of political and administrative orders emerge, they need to be 
appropriately analyzed and interpreted in view of the changes they carry for 
bureaucratic systems and public policy. 
 
Secondly, the MLA approach suggested here directs attention towards an emergent 
administrative order in Europe through the development of different sets of institutional 
configurations. The more the EU is involved in policy coordination and implementation, 
the more important become issues of administrative interaction between the involved 
political levels – if only because the EU lacks an administrative basis to conduct 
’supranational’ policies independently from member states administrative systems 
(Bauer 2006; Bauer and Becker 2014; Heidbreder 2011).  This line of research 
emphasizes patterns of integration of public administration – not its outcome. One early 
contribution to this line of research was an ‘Italian law school’ studying administrative 
engrenage (Cassese 1987; Chiti 2004; Franchini 2004; Berlin et al. 1987). Contemporary 
public administration research has similarly been preoccupied with both understanding 
the European administrative capacity building (for example, Egeberg 2006; Rittberger 
and Wonka 2011), and the interconnected nature of the European public administration 
(for example, Curtin and Egeberg 2008; Egeberg 2010; Egeberg and Trondal 2009). 
Illustrative of the latter approach, the European administrative system has been 
conceived of as a multilevel and nested network administration, though sometimes 
loosely coupled (Benz 2012; Benz 2014), where institutions at different levels of 
government ‘are linked together in the performance of tasks…’ (Hofmann and Turk 
2006: 583; see also Eising and Kohler-Koch 1999). 
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Despite successful advances in conceptualizing the EU administrative system, we argue 
that two research challenges plague contemporary public administration scholarship. 
First, public administration as ‘a’ sub-discipline (Raadschelders 2011) has paid scant 
attention to ongoing transformations of bureaucratic interaction in the EU, and how this 
relates to other developments in public sector organizations (see Verhoest et al. 2012). 
This literature has failed to account for how changing features of the state – such as 
agencification and subsequent networking of agencies – coexist with the rise of novel 
forms of multilevel administrative ‘patterns’ (e.g. Danielsen and Yesilkagit 2014; 
Egeberg 2006; Martens 2010; Trondal 2014). The administrative realities of the EU – 
perhaps with the exception of work concerning the European Commission – still 
remains under-studied outside EU studies - even though it has received increased 
academic attention in recent years (for example, Egeberg 2006; Ellinas and Suleiman 
2012; Kassim et al. 2013; Trondal 2010; Wille 2013). Public administration scholars 
have at best imperfect and partial understandings of how the European administration 
function, how bureaucratic interactions occur horizontally and vertically among various 
political layers, how administrative structures across levels are developing, how 
precisely supranational administrative actors cultivate and use resources, and how 
national bureaucratic structures and actors adapt to and exploit respective 
constellations. From an administrative science perspective it is of great importance to 
come to grips with the contemporary bureaucratic reality in the EU. 
 
The paper is continuous in the following steps: The next step outlines the MLA approach 
and the three analytical dimensions underneath. This section also subsequently shows 
how the MLA and the MLG approach are analytically distinct. According to an MLA 
approach, the European administrative system, and its component parts, is captured in 
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this paper along three analytical dimensions: (i) institutional independence, (ii) 
integration, and (iii) co-optation (see the next section). These dimensions will 
subsequently serve on the one hand to capture central aspects of the integration of 
public administration in Europe, and on the other hand to accentuate what makes the 
MLA approach different from its major rival - the MLG approach. The final section 
applies the MLA approach empirically and demonstrates why we should bother about 
the MLA approach. 
 
A Multilevel Administration (MLA) approach 
This section contributes in two important ways to our argument: First it outlines the 
contours of a MLA approach; second it discusses how this approach differs from the MLG 
approach.  
 
During two decades the multilevel character of the EU system has been intensively 
discussed (Marks 1993; Piattoni 2010). Referring to the EU as a multilevel system has 
become so colloquial that the term often gets used rather metaphorically thereby 
hollowing out its analytical value. This has perhaps contributed to the fact that the 
mechanisms which fuel the transforming potential of the multilevel constellation of EU 
policy making remain vague and poorly understood – in particular in view of their 
impact on the administrative dimension.  
 
This paper proposes that a ‘level’ refers to the following items: Separate and relatively 
independent sets of institutions, rules, procedures and personnel. Multilevel 
administration thus entails that a new platform emerges that interlinks these items at 
national level with parallel items at the level above. This platform of items consists of 
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the paradoxical mix of institutional independence and institutional interconnectedness 
across levels of government. It consists of separate institutions (such as the 
Commission) that are able to act relatively independently from member-state 
governments, and at the same time of an institutional interconnectedness between the 
very same institutions (e.g. March 1999). Already acknowledged by the multilevel 
governance literature, understanding the dynamics of this paradoxical mix – of system 
independence and interdependence – is essential in order to gain an adequate 
understanding of the multilevel character of the EU administrative system (Hooghe and 
Marks 2001; Marks et al. 1996a). 
 
A core part of the literature on the European administrative system has centered on the 
emergence of a multilevel administrative system, sometimes characterized as a 
European administrative space (Trondal and Peters 2013). This scholarship has been 
subdivided into a two-dimensional debate. Firstly, a political science debate that tries to 
theoretically conceptualize multilevel governance (MLG) more broadly (Benz 2012; 
Hooghe and Marks 2001; Marks 1993), and a more recent public administration debate 
that aims to understand the EU as a multilevel administrative system (MLA) (for 
example, Bauer and Trondal 2015; Egeberg 2006; Trondal 2007; Benz 2015).  
 
Dimensions of MLA: Institutional Independence, integration, co-optation 
We can identify basically two waves of study of ‘MLA’ (hereby termed ‘MLA I’ and ‘MLA 
II’). This paper draws attention to the second surge of research (‘MLA II’). 
• ‘MLA I’: The first wave of research emphasized convergence of administrative 
systems and policies. This research measured MLA by its outcome - which were more 
convergent administrative forms, practices and ways of doing things. This research 
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developed from the fields of comparative government and comparative public 
administration, studying for example origins and spread of common administrative 
traditions (e.g. Knill 2001; Meyer-Sahling and Yesilkagit 2011) and public management 
practices (e.g. Christensen and Lægreid 2011). ‘MLA’ was conceived of as featuring the 
convergence of administrative systems around some shared forms, organizational 
standards and values. One early contribution to this strand of research defined ‘MLA’ as 
European administrative convergence, or the ‘convergence on a common European 
model’ (Olsen 2003: 506). One example is the seminal study of national co-ordination of 
EU policy by Kassim et al. (2000). They basically examined degrees of convergence of co-
ordination arrangements in EU member-states.  Amoretti and Musilla (2011) has more 
recently showed how e-government tools create shared and integrated digital 
administrative architectures in Europe. 
• ‘MLA II’: A second and more recent line of research conceives of ‘MLA’ as 
featuring an emergent common administrative order in Europe through the 
development of new institutional constellations and configurations (Benz 2015; 
Heidbreder 2015). This second line of research emphasizes new patterns or processes of 
integration of public administration – not its outcome. Research has been preoccupied 
with both understanding European administrative capacity-building (e.g. Bauer 2006; 
Egeberg 2006; Rittberger and Wonka 2011), and understanding the interconnected 
nature of the European public administration (e.g. Curtin and Egeberg 2008; Egeberg 
2010; Egeberg and Trondal 2009). Illustrative of the latter approach, Hofmann and Turk 
(2006) and Hofmann (2008) conceive of ‘MLA’ as the emergence of a multilevel and 
nested network-administration where institutions at different levels of government ‘are 
linked together in the performance of tasks…’ (Hofmann and Turk 2006: 583; see also 
Eising and Kochler-Koch 1999).  
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Then, how can one recognize ‘MLA II’ if it occurs? Following the second wave of ‘MLA’ 
research (‘MLA II’), three proxies are suggested for analysis: institutional independence, 
integration and co-optation.  
 
Independence 
First, ‘MLA II’ involves institutionalizing some level of independent administrative 
capacity at a European level, notably the rise of relatively permanent and separate 
institutions that are able to act relatively independent from member-state governments. 
In his analysis of institutionalization in the context of political development, Huntington 
(1968) argued that autonomy was a first requirement of successful state development. 
This paper suggests how the growth of administrative capacities not only within the 
Commission but also in institutions surrounding the Commission may contribute to 
strengthening the independent capacities of the Commission - and thus facilitate the 
formation of ‘MLA’. In addition to in-house organisational capacities the Commission is 
supplied with the auxiliary capacities composed of expert committees (ECs) and EU 
agencies. Independent administrative capacities will subsequently enable the 
independent development and implementation of public policy at or from a ‘European’ 
level. 
 
Integration 
Empirically it is often observed that the rise of common administrative space do not 
result in the institutionalization of coherent administrative capacities. Instead, different 
components of administrative centers do usually overlap, counteract, layer and 
sometimes be out of synch rather than being integrated, coordinated and ‘ordered’ 
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(Orren and Skowronek 2004). Supplementing the vertical specialization of 
administrative systems, the internal integration of administrative systems is also 
increasingly documented within national governments - notably reasserting centers of 
executive government (Peters 2004; Poguntke and Webb 2005). Similarly, one strand of 
contemporary research suggests that the Commission has become increasingly 
integrated – both within the Commission administration and between the Commission 
administration and the College of Commissioners (Wille 2012). The history of the 
Commission documents periods of internal integration. Best known, perhaps, is the 
legacy of the Delors Commission (1985-94), characterized by presidential steering and a 
relative disregard of administrative routines (Christiansen 2008: 63; Kassim 2006). MLA 
thus centers attention on the extent to which we see inter- and intra-organizational 
coordination of EU-level administrative capacities – notably within the Commission – 
and the extent to which we observe parallel fragmentation, ‘silo-ization’, and sub-
culturalization of the administrative services. The question remains also if these 
competing patterns of administrative integration and disintegration may co-exist within 
the European administration, albeit embedded and layered within different 
administrative sub-units. As shown in previous studies, administrative silo-ization is 
found at the heart of policy DGs in the Commission (Trondal 2012) whilst at the same 
time we see organisational capacities emerging around the Commission President, 
partly by reforming the Secretariat-General (SG) into an administrative service center at 
the disposal for the President (Kassim and Peterson 2011). 
 
Co-optation 
The independence and integration of administrative capacities at the European level 
may not only have implications for how the Commission formulates and enacts public 
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policy. The rise of independent and integrated European administrative capacities may 
also increase its ability to co-opt administrative sub-centers by stealth – notably EU 
agencies and domestic agencies, but probably also agencies within other international 
organizations thus reaching into global administrative architectures. The horizontal 
sector specialization of the Commission services may affect how the Commission co-opts 
administrative sub-units. This may be reflected in the development of direct links 
between Commissioners and ‘their’ EU agencies, as well as the development of relatively 
tight ties between Commission DGs and domestic agencies that work within similar 
policy fields. According to an MLA II approach, both horizontal networks of regulators 
(e.g. Yesilgakit 2011) and domestic agencies (e.g. Egeberg and Trondal 2009) may be co-
opted by the Commission and offer supplies of relevant administrative capacities. 
 
 
 
Multilevel Governance and Multilevel Administration 
The MLA II approach (hereafter termed MLA) highlights analytical dimensions largely 
left untouched by the MLG approach. The above analytical dimensions serve not only to 
capture central aspects of the integration of public administration in Europe, but also to 
accentuate what makes the MLA approach different from its major rival - the MLG 
approach: This section suggests that the MLG and MLA approaches mainly vary with 
respect to units of analysis, conceptions of the coherence of units, and sources of 
contingency of governance. Our point here is not to recap the MLG approach (e.g. Bache 
and Flinders 2004; Hooghe and Marks 2004; Piattoni 2010), but to suggest how a MLA 
approach may offer attention to the administrative dimension of the European 
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administrative system and thus complements and helps systematizing a more 
encompassing theory of multilevel governance.  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Firstly, the unit of analysis differs in MLG and MLA approaches. The MLG approach has 
both historically and contemporarily applied regions as their favorite unit of analysis 
(Marks et al. 1996b; Marks et al. 2008: 113; Piattoni 2010). Focus has been on the 
relative autonomy of regions and how this autonomy supplies regions with a capacity to 
bypass state governments in their interaction with the Brussels apparatus. One 
conclusion is that the separation of domestic and international politics – and thus 
domestic and foreign affairs administrations – is ambiguous due to the 
interconnectedness of political authority across levels of governance (Hooghe and Marks 
2001, 4). In contrast, the MLA approach suggests that research focus should shift from 
regions towards the administrative interior of government institutions at different 
levels of government, principally towards administrative subunits at each level, and how 
these mutually relate. To illustrate, the MLA approach directs attention towards the 
behavior and role perceptions of unelected office holders (for example, Trondal et al. 
2010), the autonomy and interaction of subunits at each administrative level (for 
example, Ege and Bauer 2013; Egeberg 2006; Trondal and Peters 2013), the ‘in-house’ 
socialization processes of staff (for example, Beyers 2010), etc. Focus is thus not 
primarily on government apparatuses as arenas, but rather on government apparatuses 
as normative structures that mobilize bias (Schattschneider 1975) and that contribute 
to a systematic patterning of behavioural patterns among office holders (Simon 1957). 
Consequently, the way administrative subunits are formally organized at all levels of 
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government is assumed to bias the roles, beliefs, identities, and behavior evoked by the 
staff involved, and ultimately the multilevel administrative governance processes being 
processed (see below). 
 
Secondly, assumptions on the coherence of units of analysis vary between MLG and MLA 
approaches. Although the MLG approach successfully challenged the coherent nature of 
states (Piattoni 2010: 2), at the same time it largely treated its unit of analysis – regions 
– as coherent units of analysis. The definition of regions did not ‘encompass possible 
sources of regional authority …’ (Marks et al. 2008: 113). Importantly, the dimensions 
applied to measure regional authority in the MLG approach did not contribute to unpack 
the organizational architecture of regions (Marks et al. 2008: 115 – table 1). For 
example, the nine dimensions applied by Marks et al. (2008) to measure local authority 
aimed to gauge relationships between regions (as coherent black boxes) and national 
governments. None of these dimensions, however, suggested how the administrative 
interior of regions makes a difference in this regard. This lack of interest in the 
administrative inland of regions is a direct consequence of the fact that the MLG 
approach is basically interested in ‘the allocation of authority across general purpose 
jurisdictions’ and not the internal administrative architecture of regions as items for 
analysis (Marks et al. 2008: 111).  
 
This lack of attention to the organizational dimensions of multilevel systems in the MLG 
approach is paralleled in international organization (IO) studies. Recent research on 
governance in IOs pays only scant attention to the bureaucracies of these organizations 
(for example, Hawkins et al. 2006; Karns and Mingst 2004, but see Biermann and 
Siebenhühner 2009; Bauer and Ege 2014). One explanation for this lack of scholarly 
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attention to the administrative dimension is partly the gulf that exists between IO 
literature and public administration literature. One clear example of this gulf is the book 
by Acharya and Johnston (2007) that makes a comparative analysis of IOs without 
mentioning their administrative systems. Rationalist accounts of IOs – the realist, neo-
realist, and liberalist variants – treat international administrations as epiphenomena of 
the interaction of states. Studies of IOs have been preoccupied with studying the more 
visible interplay of states rather than the back-stage activities of the secretariats 
(Rochester 1986). One notable exception is the growing volume of studies of the 
Commission and to some extent reports on the UN Secretariat (for example, Chesterman 
2007; Egeberg 2006). Researching the everyday decision making of international 
bureaucracies has been of less interest than studying the voting behavior of states in 
general assemblies (Hix 2002), analyzing the great leaders of international 
bureaucracies, such as the UN General Secretary (Chesterman 2007; Cox 1969: 202; 
Rochester 1986), and studying reforms of IOs (Bauer and Knill 2007). Similarly, regime 
analysis tends to look at international administrations as intervening variables that 
‘somehow affect regime outcomes’, thus not treating international administrations as 
institutions in their own right (Bauer 2006: 26; Reinalda 2013; Underdal 2008). 
Illustrative, the seminal work of Cox and Jacobson (1973: 428) reflects this lack of 
administrative focus, concluding that ‘international organizations facilitate the orderly 
management of intergovernmental relations without significantly changing the structure 
of power that governs these relations …’. Discovering that international administrations 
can have identities, resources, authority, and interests of their own was, of course, an 
important development (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). However, seen from a public 
administration point of view, these observations are less surprising (see Ege and Bauer 
2013). The MLA approach treats their units of analysis as internally specialized. It is 
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assumed that different degrees and types of organizational specialization – both at 
national and EU level – may have systematic implications on multilevel administrative 
governance processes (see below). 
 
Finally, MLG and MLA approaches diverge on core assumptions on the contingency of 
governance processes. The MLG approach has been successful in measuring regional 
authority, and thus in accounting for local conditions of multilevel processes (Marks et 
al. 2008). It is assumed that multilevel processes are primarily fostered by different 
degrees and types of regional autonomy, although contemporary MLG research is also 
increasingly interested in assessing IO authority (Hooghe and Marks 2013). The MLG 
approach is theoretically actor-centered (Marks et al. 1996a: 348). To the extent that 
institutional variables enter the equation, they are treated as aggregative items (Marks 
et al. 1996b: 170) and thus compatible with a thin ‘exchange based’ conception of 
institutions. In such an account, ‘politics can be seen as aggregating individual 
preferences into collective action by procedures of rational bargaining, negotiation, 
coalition formation, and exchange’ (March and Olsen 1995: 7). Institutional variables are 
merely treated as intervening variables that constrain purposeful action. Nowhere does 
the MLG approach ‘unpack’ institutions as independent variables. By contrast, the MLA 
approach assumes institutions as independent variables. One crucial causal mechanism 
in the MLA approach is the supply of administrative capacities at each level of 
government. It is suggested that the supply of organizational capacities at sub-unit level 
may have certain implications for how organizations and humans act. The MLA 
approach is thus also a theory of political organization. It is assumed that organizational 
capacity building provides government institutions with leverage to act independently 
and to integrate external institutions into their orbits. The MLA approach departs from 
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the assumption that norms, rules, and routines embedded in institutions mobilize biases 
in public policy because these factors offer cognitive and normative shortcuts and 
categories that simplify and guide decision makers’ search for satisficing and 
appropriate solutions (Cyert and March 1963; March and Olsen 1989; Schattschneider 
1975; Simon 1957). Consequently, the decision-making behavior of ‘Eurocrats’ is likely 
to reflect their primary organizational embedment into government institutions and 
their sub-units.  
 
Two empirical predictions follow from this assumption: Firstly, the supply of 
independent administrative capacities is necessary for government institutions to act 
and to affect how other institutions act. Thus, the supply of administrative capacities in 
the Commission is expected to increase the likelihood that signals from the Commission 
will be ascribed importance by officials in other EU institutions and in domestic 
agencies. In effect, patterns of multilevel administrative governance between subunits 
are assumed to be supplied by the variety of administrative capacities of the 
Commission. Secondly, the behavior, role, and identity perceptions evoked by 
government officials are expected to be primarily directed towards those administrative 
subunits that are the primary supplier of relevant decision premises. It is assumed that 
multilevel administrative governance is facilitated by the organizational capacities of 
government subunits at both levels of government. One empirical implication is 
administrative integration along sectoral lines, for example between Commission DGs 
and agency subunits.  
 
In sum, this section has suggested that the MLA approaches is an important element in a 
broader theory of multilevel governance than suggested by the MLG approach. The MLA 
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approach may offer attention to the administrative dimension of the European 
administrative system and its added value is the conceptualization of administrative 
structures, values and interaction across levels of government – and is therefore a 
theory of political organization of the European administrative system. 
 
 
 
Why bother about the European administrative system? Empirical 
Illustrations 
A complete empirical application of the MLA approach is beyond the remit of this paper 
(see Bauer and Trondal 2015). The suggestive illustrations centers on the core node of 
the European administration, namely its executive arm – the Commission. However, 
some footnotes are also offered to administrative sub-units outside the Commission, but 
which serve as part of the multilevel European administration. This section examines 
the European administrative system with regard to institutional independence, 
integration, and co-optation. 
 
Academic interest in the administrative dimension of the European integration process 
grew in the aftermath of the European Single Act and the completion of the Common 
Market. It is perhaps no coincidence that the area from which this scholarly interest 
initially emerged was questions concerning the coherent and uniform national 
implementation of policies agreed upon at EU level (Siedentopf and Ziller 1988). It was 
the problem of ‘making European policies work’ coherently and timely where the 
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differential reality of national public administration systems came to the forefront (Knill 
2001). 
 
Formulating and implementing public policy in Europe has historically been a 
prerogative of national administrations. The capacity of the state has largely been 
determined by ‘the [administrative] capacity of the state to effectively achieve the 
chosen policy outcomes’ (Matthews 2012: 281). Recent studies, however, suggest that 
these prerogatives have become complemented with the rise in administrative 
capacities within and among EU institutions and their interaction with (sub)national 
actors (e.g. Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2014). A European administrative system serves 
to create an institutional infrastructure for the joint formulation and execution of public 
policy. The rise of a genuine European public administration is shown to reflect 
administrative capacity building, primarily in the Commission and EU agencies but 
increasingly also in domestic agencies and networks of regulatory agencies (Egeberg, 
Trondal and Vestlund 2015; Trondal 2015). Capacity building at the EU center may 
subsequently strengthen the Commission’s capacity to pursue independent policy 
formulation, to manage decentralized policy implementation, and to draw common 
lessons from experience. In this regard, the rise of a European administrative system at 
EU level may also strengthen the Commission’s capacity to co-opt domestic non-
majoritarian institutions and networks of these, thus integrating public administration 
in Europe across levels of government. Despite public administration being conceived of 
as a core state power (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2014), capacity building in public 
administration serves to achieve regulatory integration in mostly non-core state 
policies.  
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Institutional independence: Firstly, the rise of a European administrative system 
involves institutionalizing some degree of independent administrative capacity at 
European level, especially relatively permanent and separate institutions that are able to 
act fairly independently from member-state governments. The growth of administrative 
capacities, not only within the Commission but also in institutions surrounding the 
Commission, may contribute to strengthening the independent capacities of the 
Commission – thus facilitating the formation of a common European administrative 
system. In addition to in-house organizational capacities, the Commission has 
increasingly been supplied with auxiliary capacities composed of expert committees, EU 
agencies, networks of national regulators, and even the European Parliament (EP) 
administration. 
 
Jean Monnet intended to create a small, independent, and entrepreneurial European 
executive institution above member-state governments for the ever-closer integration of 
states. However, following a steady growth of staff over the subsequent 60 years, the 
most recent expansion of the EU administration is found at the level below the 
Commission, notably among EU agencies (Busuioc et al. 2012; Egeberg and Trondal 
2011; Rittberger and Wonka 2011). In the Commission literature a long-standing myth 
has challenged the idea of an independent Commission arguing that nationality 
fundamentally shapes the preferences of Commission staff and ultimately the internal 
functioning of the Commission (Kassim et al. 2013). However, more recent work reports 
that the Commission administration is able to act fairly independent of member-state 
governments. Studies suggest that the rise of organizational capacity inside the 
Commission, particularly in sectorally-organized DGs, in practice tends to safeguard its 
independence vis-à-vis member-state governments (for example, Ellinas and Suleiman 
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2012). Ellinas and Suleiman (2012: 65) show that top Commission bureaucrats tend to 
rely customarily on information from within the Commission administration. Moreover, 
Commission officials, also the seconded national experts, indicate a rather low degree of 
identification with their home governments and tend to have infrequent contact with 
their home administration (Murdoch and Trondal 2013). Similar observations are made 
on the position formation among permanent officials (Hartlapp et al. 2010) and on the 
role perceptions among the College of Commissioners (Egeberg 2006). 
 
Faced with an increasing agenda overload, one supplementary strategy available to the 
Commission, in addition to building in-house administrative capacities, has been to 
import external experts when preparing legislative initiatives (Christiansen and 
Kirchner 2000; Egeberg et al. 2003; Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2015; Larsson 2003). 
Studies suggest that expert committees tend in practice to strengthen the administrative 
capacity of the sectoral structure of the Commission administration for two main 
reasons. Firstly, these committees are typically subordinated directly under respective 
DGs; most expert committees report to their parent DG and seldom to other DGs. 
Secondly, most expert committees are single-task entities largely mirroring the sector 
specialization of the DGs (see Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2015). National government 
officials attending these committees also evoke a role perception that reflects their 
sector portfolios to a larger extent than their country of origin (Egeberg et al. 2003). 
 
In addition, the Commission also has EU agencies and networks of independent national 
agencies at its disposal (see Busuioc et al. 2012). Firstly, EU agencies may supply the 
Commission with relevant administrative and executive capacity. The ‘agency fever’ at 
EU level has been accelerating fairly recently (Curtin and Dehousse 2012) – since the 
22 
 
early 1990s more than 30 regulatory EU agencies have been created. Several of the 
agencies currently existing are granted some degree of formal decision-making power, 
while the remaining agencies have tasks such as information gathering, technical 
support, and administration (Groenleer 2009). Most EU agencies have restricted de jure 
powers, particularly with regard to making decisions. Still, studies document profound 
task expansion also among ‘non-regulatory’ EU agencies (Egeberg and Trondal 2011). 
EU agencies in practice thus tend to supply the Commission with executive capacities at 
the implementation stage of the policy-making cycle. In addition to EU agencies, 
networks of national regulatory agencies have mushroomed, particularly with the role 
of facilitating the implementation of EU regulations (Egeberg, Martens and Trondal 
2015). These networks have developed largely on the basis of pre-existing structures 
(for example, comitology committees), and have contributed to the accumulation and 
layering of independent administrative capacities that supports the independent 
implementation of EU regulations. 
 
Finally, even the EP administration is shown to supply the Commission with relevant 
administrative capacities (Dobbels and Neuhold 2014; Egeberg, Gornitzka, Trondal and 
Johannesen 2015). Since the EP was established it has witnessed a profound growth in 
its General Secretariat. The EP Secretariat, however, is observed to gravitate towards 
Commission DGs. For example, Egeberg, Gornitzka, Trondal and Johannessen (2015) 
show that EP officials enjoy a multiplicity of contacts as part of their daily work. 
However, the most important contact point reported is the Commission. EP officials also 
tend to emphasize most strongly arguments from the Commission, next to those from 
the Council. In short, the Commission seems to be the key interlocutor for the EP 
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administration, although a systematic comparison with the Council Secretariat has not 
been reported (Egeberg et al. 2015).  
 
In summary, therefore, the Commission now has profound independent administrative 
capacities at its disposal in addition to its increased in-house capacity. 
 
Institutional integration: Supplementing the vertical specialization of administrative 
systems, the internal integration of administrative systems is also increasingly debated 
and documented within national governments – notably reasserting centers of executive 
government (Peters 2004; Poguntke and Webb 2005). With respect to the European 
Union vertical administrative interaction has intensified – in particular after the 
Maastricht treaty went into force (Wessels 1998, 2000). Again this trend of increasing 
administrative interaction following ever greater political cooperation is best studied on 
the example of the European Commission. Studies suggest that the Commission has 
faced an enduring tension between administrative integration and disintegration – over 
time and in different parts of the services. One strand of contemporary research 
suggests that the Commission has become increasingly integrated – both within the 
Commission administration and between the Commission administration and the 
College of Commissioners – supported by an enhanced coordination role of the 
Secretariat General (Kassim et al. 2013; Wille 2012). The history of the Commission 
documents periods of internal integration – the best known of which, perhaps, are the 
legacies of the Jean Monnet presidency and the Delors presidency. Essentially, however, 
the power-base of those presidents was largely based on their personal capacities and 
achievements. The power-base was, however, less safeguarded through administrative 
capacity building (Drake 2000; Duchène 1994). The contemporary internal integration 
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of the Commission is centered on building organizational capacities around the 
President, partly by reforming the Secretariat-General (SG) into an administrative 
service center at the disposal of the President (Kassim and Peterson 2011). Hussein and 
Peterson (2011) and Hartlapp et al. (2010), suggest that this bureaucratic integration is 
mainly forged by the Commission SG. Integration within the Commission administration 
is also observed with regard to intra-service decision-making processes, the rise of a 
common ‘culture’ across DGs, and structured relationships between the Commission 
administration and outside actors – such as international organizations, EU agencies, 
and domestic agencies (see Hartlapp 2015; Kassim et al. 2013; Muroch and Trondal 
2013). 
 
A second strand of research, however, highlights that the internal administrative 
integration of the Commission merely co-exists with administrative disintegration, ‘silo-
ization’, and subculturalization of the Commission administration (for example, Ellinas 
and Suleiman 2012; Trondal 2012). A recent study suggests that the integrative 
ambitions of the Commission President and the SG sometimes exceed their integrative 
capacities (Trondal 2012). The horizontal interlocking role of the SG tends to collide 
with the organizational resources embedded in policy DGs, fuelling inter-DG conflicts of 
turfs and policies (Ellinas and Suleiman 2012: 73; Hartlapp et al. 2012: 27). The 
administrative integration of the Commission seems in practice to sometimes be 
thwarted by the horizontal specialization of the DGs and the influence of the most 
powerful DGs (Hartlapp et al. 2012: 28).  
 
In sum, despite observing profound institutional independence in the European 
administration – notably within the Commission administration (see above), the same 
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administrative apparatus face a lasting tension between administrative integration and 
disintegration.  
 
Institutional cooptation: Finally, the independence and integration of the Commission 
not only has implications for how Commission officials think and act. The rise of 
independent and integrated European administrative capacities also increases its ability 
to co-opt administrative sub-centers by stealth – particularly EU agencies and domestic 
agencies, but also agencies within other international organizations, thus reaching into 
global administrative architectures (see Gulbrandsen 2012). Studies suggest that the 
inherent sectoral logic within the Commission services has certain effects on its ability 
to co-opt administrative subunits. This is reflected in the development of direct links 
between Commissioners, DGs and ‘their’ partner EU agency (Egeberg, Trondal and 
Vestlund 2014; Groenleer 2009: 130). A recent study confirms that the pivotal role of 
the Commission in the daily life of EU agencies is evident within policy areas in which 
the Commission has considerable organizational capacities at its disposal (Egeberg and 
Trondal 2011). Moreover, at the policy formulation stage, the ‘parent’ Commission DG is 
seen by EU agency officials as particularly influential. At the policy implementation 
stage, in contrast, influence shifts towards one’s own agency and national agencies, 
although at this stage the Commission is considered the most powerful institution 
outside one’s own agency (Egeberg and Trondal 2011). The Commission thus stands out 
as more vital in the daily life of EU agencies and therefore a de facto supplier of 
administrative capacities for the Commission - particularly within policy areas in which 
the Commission has considerable organizational capacities at its disposal (see Hobolth 
and Martinsen 2013). 
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Secondly, the sectoral organization of the Commission administration is also reflected in 
its relationships to domestic agencies and their administrative networks. Both 
horizontal networks of regulators (for example, Yesilgakit 2011) and domestic agencies 
(for example, Egeberg and Trondal 2009) seem to supply the Commission with relevant 
administrative capacities, particularly in the application of EU regulations. Domestic 
agencies organized at arm’s length from ministerial departments enjoy a certain level of 
independence regarding their exercise of discretion. Recent studies suggest that even 
the daily practice of EU legislation at national level no longer remains solely in the hands 
of national governments (Egeberg, Martens and Trondal 2015). 
 
In sum, studies document processes whereby the Commission DGs in practice coopt 
administrative sub-units – notably EU agencies and domestic agencies. These processes 
are primarily observed at the implementation stage of the decision-making cycle, and in 
policy areas where the Commission DGs have substantial organizational capacities.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper has suggested a conceptual frame through which administrative order may 
be understood. Arguably, the catalogue of categories of the EU polity fails to 
acknowledge the administrative dimension. The ambition of this paper has been to offer 
a supplementary conceptual frame that takes the ‘administrative dimensions’ seriously, 
thereby also suggesting that previous accounts of the EU polity has left this dimension at 
the side. It is suggested that the European politico-administrative system should be 
conceived primarily as a European multilevel administrative system (MLA). Secondly, 
this paper has suggested how the MLA approach differ from one of its conceptual rivals 
– the multilevel governance approach (MLG). Finally, the paper has offered some 
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empirical illustrations of the MLA approach in the contemporary European 
administrative system.  
 
In sum, the paper suggests that the MLA approaches is an important element in a 
broader theory of multilevel governance than suggested by the MLG approach. The MLA 
approach may offer attention to the administrative dimension of the European 
administrative system and its added value is the conceptualization of administrative 
structures, values and interaction across levels of government – and is therefore a 
theory of political organization of the European administrative system. 
 
The theoretical interest in the administrative dimension of the EU polity is related to the 
challenge that the emerging EU administrative system poses for the discipline of public 
administration which has been largely locked in national laboratories. Theoretical 
lessons from social sciences are arguably affected by the empirical laboratories available 
to scholars. The domain of public administration may arguably gain theoretical advances 
by challenging methodological nationalism. Moreover, despite successful advances in 
conceptualizing the EU administrative system, this paper has argued that public 
administration as a sub-discipline has paid scant attention to ongoing transformations of 
bureaucratic interaction in the EU, and how this relates to other developments in public 
sector organizations. This literature has failed to account for how changing features of 
the state – such as agencification – impact and fuel the rise of novel forms of multilevel 
administrative governance. According to the MLA approach outlined here, the European 
administrative system, and its component parts, is taken seriously. This is captured 
along three analytical dimensions: institutional independence, integration, and co-
optation. These dimensions serve first to capture central aspects of the integration of 
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public administration in Europe, and secondly to accentuate what makes the MLA 
approach different from one of its rivals - the MLG approach. 
 
Future studies applying the MLA approach would be potentially manifold. We would 
particularly emphasize the attractiveness of studying the sustainability of the European 
administrative system. One way to do this would be to study how it operates under 
stress and turbulence. The sustainability and resilience of institutional independence, 
integration and cooptation may be taken for granted during periods of stability. During 
periods of turbulence, these items might be subject to test. Turbulent times – such as 
those typically associated with financial stress - are marked by the lack of ‘order, 
rationality, control and predictability’ (Cohen et al. 2012: 7). Turbulence is coined by 
long-term unruliness and tensions within environments and organizations - that might 
go unnoticed by practitioners and observers. As seen by the recent Euro-zone crisis in 
Europe, the Euro was marked by some kind of unsettledness already from the launch of 
the new Euro area, but the sudden crisis that hit Greece – and subsequent EU member 
states - unveiled the latent turbulent nature of the arrangement. During turbulence 
decision-makers face choices that need to be made under unfamiliar degrees of 
uncertainty (Tamuz and Lewis 2008: 158). Turbulent times can reveal the fragility of 
institutions and produce surprising cascading dynamics that test the sustainability of 
existing governance arrangements. We suggest that turbulent times also represent an 
underappreciated opportunity to examine the resilience of organizations and organized 
systems. Less attended to by contemporary scholarship, unsettled systems of 
governance offer ample opportunity for scholarly reflection, stock taking, and suggest 
new ways forward (Olsen 2007). 
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Table 1 Some variations between the MLG and MLA approach 
 MLG MLA 
Unit of analysis Political arenas 
 
Public sector administrations, 
and their sub-units 
Coherence of units Not specialized (regions as 
cohesive units) 
 
Highly specialized 
(administrative organizations 
as consisting of horizontally 
and vertically specialized 
sub-units) 
Sources of contingency of 
(administrative) governance 
The supply of regional 
authority 
The supply of administrative 
capacities at different levels 
of government 
Source: own compilation. 
 
